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Information security is an increasing concern in the software development business in the EU. 
Legislation and regulation is an ongoing change due to the EU data protection regulation 
proposal. Customers and authorities pose also increasing demands for the software vendors. 
Information security adds to the overall quality of software and is a characteristic valued by the 
customers. However, information security is not just about the technical solutions but it is also 
about the people and processes. This poses challenges to the management of a software 
development company if it is not prepared for in the risk management approach. 
This study was commissioned by Agenteq Solutions Oy and it begins with an overview of the 
company. The objective was to study the potential of security development in the system 
development life cycle through the current process maturity level in the company. This study 
was conducted also to create change. The theory section examines the risk management and 
information security challenges of a software company. 
The practical part consists of implementing a security development project in the company and 
results to an information security policy and a risk assessment implementation. This leads to the 
evaluation of the current status on information security activity in the company from the risk 
management perspective. 
The practical section introduces what was learned during the project. The results of the security 
development project are described. Development suggestions are also made. The secondary 
objective of this study is to prepare the company also for responding to the information security 
assurance needs presented for example by the VAHTI guidance. 
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TIETOTURVALLISUUDEN KEHITTÄMISTOIMET 
OHJELMISTOKEHITYKSEN ELINKAARESSA – 
AGENTEQ SOLUTIONS OY 
Tietoturvallisuus on ohjelmistoliiketoiminnan lisääntyvä huolenaihe EU:n alueella. Lainsäädäntö 
ja määräykset ovat muutosprosessin alaisia johtuen EU:hun suunnitellusta uudesta tietosuoja-
asetuksesta. Asiakkaat ja viranomaiset esittävät jatkuvasti uusia vaatimuksia 
ohjelmistotoimittajille. 
Tietoturvallisuus on ohjelmiston laatua parantava elementti. Asiakkaat arvostavat tietoturvallista 
ohjelmistoa. Tietoturvallisuudessa ei kuitenkaan ole kyse vain teknologiasta vaan myös 
ihmisistä ja prosesseista. Tämä luo haasteita ohjelmistoyritysten johdolle, jos tähän ei ole 
riskinhallinnassa varauduttu. 
Tämän tutkimuksen toimeksiantaja oli Agenteq Solutions Oy. Tutkimus alkaa yrityksen 
yleisesittelyllä. Tavoitteena oli tutkia tietoturvallisuuden kehittämismahdollisuuksia 
ohjelmistokehityksen elinkaaressa yrityksen nykyisen prosessikäytännön kautta. Tutkimuksen 
tavoitteena oli myös luoda muutospohjaa. Teoriaosuus käsittelee riskinhallintaa ja 
ohjelmistoyrityksen tietoturvallisuushaasteita. 
Tutkimuksen käytännön osuus sisältää tietoturvallisuuden kehittämisprojektin toteutuksen 
yrityksessä ja johtaa tietoturvapolitiikan käyttöönottoon sekä riskikartoituksen toteutukseen. 
Tämän tuloksena yrityksen tietoturvatoimien tämänhetkinen tila arvioidaan riskinhallinnallisesta 
näkökulmasta. 
Käytännön osiossa kerrotaan myös projektin aikana opitut asiat. Kehittämisprojektin tulokset 
esitetään ja kehitysehdotuksia tehdään. Tutkimuksen toissijainen tavoite oli valmistella yritystä 
vastaamaan tietoturvallisuuden varmentamisvaatimuksiin joita muun muassa VAHTI-ohjeistus 
asettaa. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Agenteq Solutions Oy 
Agenteq Solutions Oy (later Agenteq Oy), founded in 1999, is a software com-
pany located in Salo, Helsinki, Rauma and Savonlinna. Agenteq Oy provides 
software development, consultant and subcontracted work services for custom-
ers in Finland. The main customer line is real estate and the communication 
sectors (Agenteq Solutions Oy 2012a). The main product is Tampuuri (Suomen 
Talokeskus Oy 2012a). Agenteq Oy operates as a product development com-
pany for real estate markets. The company also provides services for software 
project customers. The project business was a major line before the Tampuuri 
product gained its current success. The project customers range from public to 
sports organisations. 
The turnover of Agenteq Oy was approximately 6.3 million euros in 2012, and 
the company currently has 59 employees. Agenteq Oy is owned by Suomen 
Talokeskus Oy, which is an engineering office providing various types of spe-
cialist services for real estate renovation, maintenance and energy manage-
ment (Suomen Talokeskus Oy 2012a). Suomen Talokeskus Oy was previously 
responsible for the development of the Tampuuri product but the responsibilities 
were transferred to Agenteq Oy in 2008, which included sales, marketing and 
contractual obligations (Agenteq Solutions Oy 2012b). Suomen Talokeskus Oy 
is now focusing on providing services to Tampuuri in addition to their traditional 
services. 
Organisation 
The organisational structure of Agenteq Oy in 2012 is described in figure 1. The 
company is divided into three business units which operate with software devel-
opment. 
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Figure 1. Organisational structure of Agenteq Oy in 2012 (Agenteq Solutions Oy 
2012c). 
The customership unit develops the Tampuuri product together with product 
management, and focus on the real estate industry. The e-service solutions unit 
provides e-services on top of Tampuuri but also on top of other products such 
as the Latomo publishing system. The e-service solutions unit is also heavily 
involved in the real estate industry. The customised software solutions unit op-
erates independently servicing customers in other industries. The other units 
exist as overall support to these business units. 
The information security policy 
Agenteq Oy implemented an information security policy during 2012. Planning 
of the policy started in March 2012 and it was finalised and published in August 
2012. The information security policy was created by an information security 
development group (also referred to later as the steering group) consisting of 
9 
 
the CEO, the IT Service Manager and the main researcher of this development. 
However, it was finalised, revised and accepted by the management group and 
the CEO (J Borenius 2012, pers. comm. 20 August). 
The information security policy is relevant from a development work perspective 
since it created the framework which specifies the scope and position of infor-
mation security. It also gives the mandate for working in the company to im-
prove information security. The information security policy is an important guide-
line for this development work. Agenteq Oy’s information security policy speci-
fies the goals, demands of the operating environment, risk management, signifi-
cance of information security, and the information security activity in the com-
pany. The three lines of relevant information to be protected are specified as: 
 Information owned by customers 
 Information concerning customers, in possession of Agenteq Oy’s per-
sonnel 
 Information concerning Agenteq Solution Oy’s own business 
(Agenteq Solutions Oy 2012d). 
It is stated that Agenteq Oy is in the middle of legislative requirements as it pro-
cesses customer’s personal data in its products. However, customer demands 
and expectations have also increased to the level, which justifies the acknowl-
edgment and development of information security. It also enforces the search 
for an overall better process where information security forms an integrated 
part. (Agenteq Solutions Oy 2012d.) 
While being developed the role of the information security policy was to guide 
the upstream process which for example consisted of finding and documenting 
the relevant pieces of information in possession of the company. The actual 
development work started right after the policy was finalised and published. 
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1.2 Tampuuri product 
Tampuuri is a web-based information system for real-estate business actors 
such as housing managers, real estate service companies, public sector organ-
isations, property management companies, rental service companies, associa-
tions, and major real estate owners (Agenteq Solutions Oy 2012e). Tampuuri is 
a so-called real estate information system which is an information system de-
veloped specifically for real estate administration and management. Real estate 
information systems help parties related to real estate property to manage in-
formation related to administrating, managing and developing the various real 
estate functions. (Suomen Talokeskus Oy 2012e.) 
Tampuuri is provided as a SaaS-service which means that Agenteq Oy is also 
responsible for the operating and maintenance of the system. Most of the cus-
tomers use Agenteq Oy’s hosting model. However, some of the customers also 
have also acquired a dedicated installation. These are hosted in the customer’s 
own environment. From a customer’s point of view, acquiring Tampuuri is pro-
curing software from the cloud. Some integration solutions, for example banking 
software, blur this line because not all operational software is included in Tam-
puuri. The customer also needs to integrate some of their own software into 
Tampuuri in order for the processes to work completely. This is seen as vertical 
integration. 
There is currently an evolving necessity to get closer to a cloud service model. 
Agenteq Oy is relocating from the single customer’s context to multi-customer 
services and processes and provides e-services. Networking and integration 
occurs at the Tampuuri-installation level that will involve connecting and inte-
grating Tampuuri customers. This is seen as creating a Tampuuri cloud which 
could mean accessing data at a network level and using this wider-scale access 
for providing branch-level information services. For example, a performance 
analysis of actors on a certain area would create more business opportunities 
by connecting customers with each other when they could offer peer services. 
(Borenius 2012.) 
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From a technical standpoint, the Tampuuri product is implemented with Mi-
crosoft technologies including the .NET framework and a SQL Server database.  
1.3 Context of the development work 
1.3.1 Operating environment pressure 
Growth has pushed Agenteq Oy to a level where current working methods are 
not adequate enough. There are continuous development needs must be priori-
tised and addressed. Over the last couple of years the company has reached a 
total of 50 employees. Simultaneously, global news reports feature network se-
curity breaches and information disclosures almost daily. This has raised con-
cerns in the management about the effort the company has placed on infor-
mation security. The new CEO of Agenteq Oy started in his position at the be-
ginning of 2012. He has actively started working on developing information se-
curity awareness within the company. 
The attitude towards software development companies has tightened concern-
ing information security. The data protection ombudsman Reijo Aarnio has stat-
ed an open question. He questions that if software companies still develop 
software after the implementation of the new EU data protection regulation they 
may not fulfil the legal requirements. According to Aarnio, there have been cas-
es over the years where the software has not made it possible to take care of 
the legal obligations. The intention of the software development industry is rele-
vant in a situation where legal authorities are receiving new powers to react to 
illegality. An important consideration is that the current legislation obliges the 
data controller, but the new data protection regulation proposal is changing this 
with the “privacy by design” and “privacy by default” obligations. Aarnio believes 
this brings new business opportunities to the entire industry. (Aarnio 2012.) 
The customers of Agenteq Oy are data controllers in their core business in 
which they set up a personal data file for their own use. The customers are real 
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estate business actors, for example, housing companies, which have legal au-
thority to set up a personal data file. (Personal Data Act 22.4.1999/523.) 
Agenteq Oy is under the requirements of the Personal Data Act for any imple-
mentation cases of the Tampuuri product as the company’s employees convert 
data from the customer’s old environment to the newer Tampuuri environment. 
This is the case when this conversion concerns personal data of the customer’s 
customers (customers of the data controller). In this case Agenteq Oy is a data 
processor which processes the personal data on behalf of the data controller. 
(Personal Data Act 22.4.1999/523.) 
Another consideration is the e-services which Agenteq Oy provide to its cus-
tomers to supplement the Tampuuri product. These services have specific ele-
ments which mean they must meet the requirements of the Act on the Protec-
tion of Privacy in Electronic Communications. These services match the defini-
tion of a value added service. Such a service is based on the processing of 
identification or location data but with another purpose than provisioning of a 
network service or communication service. (Act on the Protection of Privacy in 
Electronic Communications 16.6.2004/516.) 
The nature of Agenteq Oy’s business is reaching a point where the integration 
of business processes between Tampuuri customers is becoming a key feature. 
Customers need features which connect them to other business actors such as 
their own customers and suppliers. However this also brings challenges since 
this must happen securely and also efficiently. While data is being transferred 
from one system to another, Agenteq Oy’s role is to also take responsibility for 
security on behalf of the customer. The existing database boundaries are not 
adequate any longer. The entire Tampuuri environment is seen as an ecosys-
tem where multiple service providers could exist and this requires refreshed 
thinking. (Borenius 2012.) 
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1.3.2 Processes in focus  
There are three processes which are focused upon in this development work. 
They are the new feature development process, operator process and customer 
support process. Software development, distribution, support and maintenance 
are performed in numerous steps in these processes. Therefore, the main prac-
tical security activity is performed, or should be performed, in these steps as 
well. These processes form the core of Agenteq Oy’s software development 
lifecycle. This has implications for the company’s customers which look at this 
from a buyer’s perspective since Agenteq Oy is a software vendor for them. 
There also exists the implementation project process – led by the customership 
unit - but its role exists when customers initially implement Tampuuri for their 
use. The project managers involved in implementation projects are business 
specialists, not technical persons. The technical implementation work arrives at 
the IT unit in Agenteq Oy with the data conversions from the old software format 
to Tampuuris and software development being performed by the Tampuuri’s 
development team. These tasks are included in the tasks for new feature devel-
opment process (sprints) described in chapter 1.3.3. The implementation project 
process is a little out the context for this development work and therefore it is 
not covered in detail. However, from the system development life cycle (SDLC) 
perspective the existence of the process is acknowledged. The SDLC is a struc-
tured methodology which can be used by an organisation to effectively develop 
an information system (NIST 2008, 5). 
The actors in the three processes are described in Table 1. 
Table 1. Actors in the main processes. 
Actor	 Description
Customer	 A	company operating	 in	 the real	estate	 industry	and	using	 the Tampuuri	
product	for	its	business.	
Development	 Team	
(Production)	
Sub‐team	 in	 the	production	unit	 that	 focuses on	 the	development	of	cer‐
tain	industry	features.	
     (to be continued) 
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Table 1 (continues). 
Actor	 Description
Development	 Team	
Leader	
Supervisor	of	the	software	development	team.
Extended	 Product	
Management	Team	
A	group	consisting	of the CEO,	Customer	Director,	Sales	Director and	all	of	
the	product	managers.		
Operator	 Technical	personnel	focusing	on	software	maintenance	and	distribution.	
Product	Manager	 A	sales‐oriented member	of personnel	who focuses	on	product	features	so	
that	they	fulfil	customer	and	industry	needs.	
Sales	 Sales	Manager	or	Sales	Director	that focus	on	selling	new	Tampuuri	instal‐
lations.		
Support	Service	Team	 A	team	of	service	desk	people	 focusing	on	customer	support	activities‐ A	
team	 responds	 to	 support	 calls	 and	 communicates	 with	 the	 customers,	
testers	and	the	development	team.	
Support	System Internal	software	system	in	which	support	tickets	are	maintained.
Test	Team	 A	team	of	test	engineers	focusing	on	testing	new	features	and	distribution	
versions	
 
The actors are basically relevant stakeholders in the processes (except the 
support system). Chapters 1.3.3 to 1.3.5 describe these processes in detail. 
1.3.3 New feature development process 
The first is the new feature development process (Figure 2), which governs 
software feature development from an idea to delivering a new version. This 
process is the most complex, and involves the biggest number of actors in the 
company. The process involves a customer, a sales person, a product manag-
er, the extended product management team, the development team leader, de-
velopers from the production team, and testers from the test team. 
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Figure 2. New feature development process (Agenteq Solutions Oy 2012f). 
The process starts with an idea from a customer or a product manager. This is 
then documented and placed in the internal document location dedicated for 
features from the product management perspective. A support case, described 
in detail in the operator process subchapter, might also be a source for a devel-
opment idea. The product manager describes the solution at a business re-
quirement level and asks comments from sales people and the software devel-
opment team. 
In the next step, an offer is made to the customer. In cases where the amount of 
work exceeds ten days, the idea is also presented to the extended product 
management team. Based on feedback from the extended product manage-
ment team the product manager does an implementation decision and the cus-
tomer will be acknowledged. The acknowledgement contains information about 
16 
 
the initially expected delivery schedule. Simultaneously, the development team 
leader performs an initial resource allocation for the task in question. 
The development task advances in accordance with the scrum agile methodol-
ogy model. As described by Paul (2011, 245), the scrum methodology is based 
on adjusted-lengths of release cycles, called sprints, to allow the requirement 
changes on the fly. The software is in constant state of readiness for release 
after a sprint (Paul 2011, 245). The heart of scrum methodology, as in any agile 
practise, is early and frequent delivery of working software, close collaboration 
between developers and customers, self-organising teams and a focus on ad-
aptation to changing circumstances (Bass et al. 2013, 45). 
In Agenteq Oy the development team operates in two-week sprints which al-
ways start with a planning meeting in which the entire development team and 
the product manager participate. The development task is processed, along 
with others, in the planning meeting and in case it is feasible – based on work-
load and what’s been promised to the customer - it might be chosen to be pro-
cessed in the sprint to develop a new feature. Processing by the development 
team includes: 
 Requirements clarification 
 Development plan creation 
 Technical implementation specification creation 
 Design 
 Coding 
 Testing 
 Documenting 
 Adding and maintaining the source control repository 
 Installing the feature to the test site 
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 Adding the used work hours to the invoicing system. 
The test team assesses the feature on the test site and provides their feedback 
which is taken into consideration in the sprint review demo session viewed by 
the entire development team. This session ends a sprint. The product manager 
along with the development team leader either approves or rejects the feature 
based on implementation documentation and the test team’s feedback. If the 
feature is rejected it is taken automatically for work in the following sprint. 
Finally, the work hours consumed to complete the feature are approved and are 
used as a basis for invoicing the customer. The customer receives an invoice 
and the feature adds up to the new software version. The feature is installed to 
the customer within the software distribution version and this is performed in the 
operator process described in the next subchapter. 
1.3.4 Operator process 
The aim of the operator process, described in figure 3, is to deliver a new soft-
ware version or a fix to the customer environment. The customer environment is 
usually the customer’s own test environment and after the customer has ac-
cepted the version in their test environment, the process is repeated for the 
production environment. Actors in the operator process include the develop-
ment team, an operator which includes people from the IT team, and test team, 
and the customer. 
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Figure 3. Operator process (Agenteq Solutions Oy 2012g). 
The process starts with the development team (but also with the help of a prod-
uct manager) writing up a version cover note for the version, or a fix. The opera-
tor pre-checks this information and asks the development team to fix this if there 
are shortcomings. When the version information is ok, the customer is notified 
about the new version with the version cover note as a reference. If the cus-
tomer has a dedicated software installation, the time and date of the upgrade is 
suggested. In cases where there are multi-customer installations, the upgrade 
date is not negotiated. With the dedicated installation customers, the date and 
time of the upgrade is finalised by negotiating. The resources are also prepared 
and allocated for the updates right after the dates are known. 
The process proceeds to the actual update step. The software is updated and 
testers in the operator role also perform tests in the target environment in order 
to ensure the quality is withheld. If the update has severe critical failures it is 
rolled back and the development team needs to resolve the issue. This also 
leads to rescheduling the update. However, if there are issues, they are solved 
during the update step so rescheduling occurs very rarely. In any case, if the 
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update fails or succeeds, the customer is notified that they can continue their 
process with the environment or if the update needs to be rescheduled. Every 
participant in the process also writes up their working hours to the invoicing sys-
tem. The operator process marks the step when the feature or version is dis-
tributed to the customer and is transferred to the customer support process, 
which is described in the next subchapter. 
1.3.5 Customer support process 
The aim of the customer support process (figure 4) is to support the customer’s 
procedures with the current software distribution version. Actors in the process 
include customer, support service team and the development team. The support 
system is also included as a separate actor because its role is essential in sup-
porting the process by storing the support tickets. 
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Figure 4. Customer support process (Agenteq Solutions Oy 2012h). 
The customer support process starts when a customer expresses the need for 
support by contacting the support personnel via telephone or e-mail. The cus-
tomer’s message is analysed and a support ticket is opened in the support sys-
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tem. If more information is needed from the customer, he or she is notified and 
asked to provide the necessary information. If customer support can solve the 
ticket with the given information, the customer is given a solution and the ticket 
is closed. If customer support cannot solve the ticket, the customer is notified 
that the ticket has been transferred to another responsible development team 
for solving the issue. 
The development team actively follows the assigned support tickets during their 
working shift. The development team takes a support ticket under working sta-
tus and aims to resolve it as quickly as possible. When the issue is resolved, 
the development team writes comments to the ticket and changes the ticket to a 
resolved status. The support service team follows tickets resolved by the devel-
opment team. The support service team answers the customer with a solution 
and closes the ticket. If there are any issues, the ticket is returned to the devel-
opment team for further inspection. Participants of the customer support pro-
cess actively write down their working hours to the invoicing system. 
1.4 Research process 
1.4.1 Research problem and philosophy 
Agenteq Oy has no known method for finding and documenting the security de-
velopment needs in the SDLC, which could be understood by every hierarchical 
level of the organisation. The level of security risk has been unclear for the 
management and the related processes have been fragmented and informal. 
This has made managing risk difficult in practise. The response to potential 
problems is more reactive than proactive because the problem area is un-
known. There has also been an element of reactive culture which Knapp (2010, 
220) defines to be simply reacting to events occurring each day. This is a sign 
of a lower-level of process maturity in general (Knapp 2010, 62). Problems 
come up mostly in customer interactions where it is often too late from being 
prevented and the company reputation is in jeopardy of being tarnished. The 
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goal is to improve the recognition of security development needs and integrate 
risk management in the company software development processes so that it 
becomes a process as well. 
The philosophical assumption of this thesis is interpretivism. Interpretivism 
builds on the belief that social reality is subjective. Social reality is shaped by 
human perception. The researcher cannot be separated from what’s being re-
searched. The reality is impacted by the act of researching it. (Collis and Hus-
sey 2009, 57.) 
This thesis is carried out by an employee in a software development company. 
In practise it is impossible to separate the researcher from the company opera-
tions for the duration of conducting the research. This is supported by the criti-
cism of positivism stated by Collis and Hussey (2009, 56) that it is impossible to 
separate people from the social context in which they exist. 
From an epistemological assumption standpoint in interpretivism it is attempted 
to minimise the distance between the researcher and that which is researched. 
On the other hand, in positivism, it is believed that that only what is observable 
and measurable can be considered as valid knowledge. Therefore an inde-
pendent and objective stance is required. (Collis and Hussey 2009, 59.) 
This is another argument favoring interpretivism since the researcher has a very 
short distance to what’s being researched. The researcher acts in the company 
processes that are being researched. Some form of participative enquiry is very 
likely to be needed because the research topic requires co-operation with other 
workers in the company. 
In interpretivism the research is an inductive process where interpretive under-
standing of social phenomena is created in a specific context (Collis and Hus-
sey 2009, 57). This arguments for interpretivism from a research problem 
standpoint since the purpose is to develop an understanding. 
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1.4.2 Research method 
The research method is action research. Applied research uses the action re-
search methodology to find an effective way to bring conscious change in a 
partly controlled environment (Collis and Hussey 2009, 81). Action research 
combines theory and practice through change and reflection (Avison et al. 1999, 
94). Action research acknowledges that the social world is constantly changing 
(Collis and Hussey 2009, 81). The researcher and research are part of this 
change through involving researchers and practitioners acting together in cycles 
of the iterative research process (Collis and Hussey 2009, 81; Avison et al. 
1999, 94). 
Action research focuses on research in action and it is collaborative and demo-
cratic by its nature (Coghlan and Brannick 2010, 5). By emphasising collabora-
tion between researchers and practitioners, action research is a promising re-
search method for information systems (Avison et al. 1999, 95). The central 
idea is that action research uses a scientific approach to study important social 
or organisational issues together with those who experience these issues direct-
ly through nature (Coghlan and Brannick 2010, 5). Action research can be used 
to address complex problems and concerns of practitioners while contributing to 
the science (Avison et al. 1999, 95; Collis and Hussey 2009, 81). Members of 
the system being studied participate actively in the cyclical process of action 
research by impacting on the research focus and engaging in the action and 
inquiry (Coghlan and Brannick 2010, 5; Collis and Hussey 2009, 81).  
Action research consists of a certain sequence of events and an approach to 
problem solving. From an event sequence perspective it comprises of iterative 
cycles of: 
 Gathering data 
 Feeding data back to those concerned 
 Analyzing the data 
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 Planning action 
 Taking action 
 Evaluating that leads to data gathering. 
(Coghlan and Brannick 2010, 5.) 
In action research the overall process is performed jointly (Coghlan and Bran-
nick 2010, 5). The researcher wants to try out a theory with practitioners in real-
world situations, gain feedback from this, modify the theory as a result and try it 
again (Avison et al. 1999, 95). From a problem solving perspective, action re-
search applies fact-finding and experimentation to practical problems requiring 
action solutions. The desired outcomes are not just immediate solutions but al-
so learning from intended and unintended outcomes. (Coghlan and Brannick 
2010, 5.) 
A model of the action research cycle is described in figure 5. 
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Figure 5. An action research cycle (Coghlan and Brannick 2010, 8). 
The context and purpose step is a pre-step in the action research cycle. The 
step consists of placing questions on the importance and context of the action. 
The second important consideration is the relationships to those who the ques-
tions related to the cycle concern. From the main steps, constructing means 
forming an understanding what the issues are. The planning action step is a 
consistent follow up and in line with the previous steps in order to plan the ac-
tion implementation. Taking action is the step for implementing the plans col-
laboratively. Evaluating action is the step to examine the outcomes of the action 
to see if the original action plan was fitting. Did the action match the under-
standing (construction)? Was the action taken in an appropriate manner? What 
feedback does the next cycle require? (Coghlan and Brannick 2010, 8 – 10.) In 
practise, when performing action research, there are multiple cycles occurring 
concurrently (Coghlan and Brannick 2010, 10). Figure 6 illustrates this. 
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Figure 6. A spiral of action research cycles (Coghlan and Brannick 2010, 10). 
The reasoning for selecting action research is that the method is similar to the 
agile development methods used in Agenteq Oy. Agile software development 
methods are incremental and iterative. This is seen as a frequent deployment of 
software in increments, as good collaboration between customers and develop-
ers, and as a focus on adapting to changes. (Bass et al. 2013, 43 – 44.) These 
are qualities strongly relating to action research. The goal is to create change, 
which is always created in action research. The action research contributes to 
the planned change process because it has collaborative inquiry and learning 
built in. (Coghlan and Brannick 2010, 70.) In action research the role of the re-
searcher is dual because the researcher is not separate from the system being 
researched. The researcher is part of the system as a member of the organisa-
tion and as a researcher which can be challenging and also create conflict sit-
uations because these roles have varying requirements. (Coghlan and Brannick 
2010, 119.) 
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Data collection methods are in line with the research questions in the research 
problem. These are listed in table 2. 
Table 2. Research questions and data collection methods. 
 
The methodology for this is to use data triangulation which means collecting 
data from different sources or at different times (Collis and Hussey 2009, 85). 
Problem	/	Research	question	 Data	collection	methods	
How	to	find,	understand	and	document	the	secu‐
rity	development	needs	in	the	SDLC?	
 Information	security	risk	assessment	
 CEO	interview	
 Asset	and	process	documentation	
How	to	manage	risks	in	the	SDLC?  Information	 security	 risk	
management		
 Information	 security	 best‐practises	
material	analysis	
 Self‐assessment	
How	to	turn	risk	management	 in	the	SDLC	into	a
process?	
 Information	 security	 risk	 assessment	
result	analysis	
 Information	 security	 best‐practises	
material	analysis	
 Self‐assessment	
 Recommendations	 and	 implementa‐
tions	based	on	previous	analysis	
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2 SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
“Security is a measure of the system’s ability to protect data and information 
from unauthorised access while still providing access to people and systems 
that are authorised”. A simple approach to characterise security is with confi-
dentiality, integrity and availability. Confidentiality means protecting data or ser-
vices from unauthorised access. Integrity means protecting data or services 
from unauthorised manipulation. Availability means keeping the system availa-
ble for legitimate use. (Bass et al. 2013, 147.) 
Business and information processing with systems has risks like any other hu-
man activity. These cannot necessarily be removed but their likelihood can be 
decreased, their impacts can be mitigated, and one can prepare for them or 
willingly be unprepared for some of the risks. (Hakala et al. 2006, 90.) NIST, 
National Institute of Standard and Technology, (2002, 1) states that a risk is an 
impact with negative consequences of the exercise of vulnerability when both 
the probability and impact of occurrence are considered. A total risk is the likeli-
hood or probability of an unwanted, unintended or harmful event which is com-
puted using factors including the asset value, threat and vulnerability (Paul 
2011, 20). 
An asset is an item which is valuable to the organisation, the owner of the asset 
(Landoll 2011, 26). Assets can be tangible, which means they are physically 
perceivable (example: software code). Assets can also be intangible which 
means they are more abstract (example: brand reputation). Loss of an asset 
can jeopardise the organisation’s capability to accomplish its mission. (Paul 
2011, 16.) A vulnerability is a flaw that may possibly allow a threat agent to ex-
ploit it (Landoll 2011, 29). A vulnerability can also be accidentally triggered 
(NIST 2002, 12). Vulnerabilities play an important role in risk management and 
assessment because they are instrumental in risk determination; both existing 
risk and residual risk (Landoll 2011, 29). A threat is the possibility of a threat 
source or threat agent to successfully exercise a particular vulnerability (NIST 
2002, 12). A threat source or a threat agent is an actor, being anyone or any-
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thing, human or nonhuman, having the potential to materialise the threat. A 
threat source intentionally causing a threat to happen is referred to as attacking. 
(Paul 2011, 18.) 
A control is a method to manage the risk and it includes activities, guidance and 
organisational structures (Hakala et al. 2006, 420). Controls are mechanisms to 
mitigate the threats to assets (software and systems) (Paul 2011, 19). Residual 
risk is the risk that remains after the implementation of safeguards (controls). It 
is a very important element because it is the risk that will be inherited and the 
organisation’s management needs to understand the concept that they need to 
accept the residual risk. (Hakala et al. 2006, 108; Landoll 2011, 33.) Residual 
risk should be less than the acceptable risk (Hakala et al. 2006, 92). 
These concepts of risk management are described in figure 7. The flow is such 
that the owners value their assets and wish to minimise the risk to them. Threat 
agents wish to abuse assets. Threat agents may increase threats that again 
increase risk to these assets. Threats may exploit vulnerabilities leading to a 
risk to the assets. These vulnerabilities might be known or unknown to the own-
ers. Known vulnerabilities can be mitigated by implementing controls which re-
duce the risk to the assets. Controls themselves can also pose risk – by having 
vulnerabilities - to the assets. (Paul 2011, 25.) 
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Figure 7. Risk management concept flow (Paul 2011, 25). 
Information security risk is one component of organisational risk which can con-
sist of many types of risks such as legal liability risks, and program manage-
ment risks, etc. Information security risk is commonly linked to the operation 
and usage of information systems. (NIST 2011, 1.) 
Risk management is the process of identifying risk, assessing risk and reducing 
risk (NIST 2002,1). The goal of risk management is to reduce a risk to an ac-
ceptable level (Paul 2011, 18 – 19). Risk management, however, does span 
more than the protection of IT assets as the intention is to protect the entire or-
ganisation. Risk management, in the context of software security, is balancing 
between IT assets and the cost of implementing security controls, so that the 
risk can be handled. (Paul 2011, 15 - 16.) Risk management, along with setting 
the criteria for acceptable risk is the responsibility of an organisation’s man-
agement. However, in practice the evaluation criteria is created and defined by 
the information management unit of the organisation. (Hakala et al. 2006, 90.) 
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NIST (2011, 8) expands the definition of the risk management process to con-
sist of four components: framing risk, assessing risk, responding to risk and 
monitoring risk. The relationship of these components is described in figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Risk management process (NIST 2011, 8). 
The risk framing component is when an organisation establishes a risk context. 
It means describing the environment in which risk based decisions are made. 
The ultimate aim is to produce a risk management strategy which sets the 
boundaries for risk-based decisions. The risk assessment step specifies how 
organisations assess risk in the context specified in the framing component. 
(NIST 2012, 4 – 5.) 
In a security risk assessment, the components include an organisation’s threat 
environment, the asset values, the system’s criticality, the security controls and 
vulnerabilities and the expected impact of any loss are reviewed. The step pro-
vides further recommendations for risk reduction. (Landoll 2011, 4.) The end 
result is a determination of risk (NIST 2012, 5). Based on it, senior management 
can determine if additional controls are required (Landoll 2011, 4). 
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Responding to risk is the third component. Its role is to address how risk is re-
sponded to after it is determined based on the risk assessment results. The 
purpose is to create an organisation-wide risk response by developing alterna-
tive courses of action, determining appropriate courses of action (considering 
the organisation’s risk tolerance) and implementing selected courses of action. 
(NIST 2012, 5.) 
The fourth component is risk monitoring. The purpose is to monitor the risk over 
a period of time to create an understanding of what is the effectiveness of ongo-
ing risk responses and verify that information security requirements are derived 
from and traceable to the organisational mission. An important task is to also 
identify the changes in the risk environment and consider an organisation’s in-
formation systems. (NIST 2012,5.) 
Risk management integration into an organisation’s SDLC is essential to make 
it work effectively. An organisation wants to minimise the impact of risk and 
have a clear basis for decision making. These are important reasons for imple-
menting risk management for IT systems (NIST 2002, 4.) The key thing is to 
realise that information security activities can bring lots of valuable input into IT 
system management and development, which enables risk identification, plan-
ning and mitigation activities. A risk management approach for systems and 
projects means integrating security early and throughout the established SDLC. 
This enables security to be developed as an integral part of the system. (NIST 
2008, 4.) The system development lifecycle or software development lifecycle 
(which is the synonym) consists of five steps. These steps are described in ta-
ble 3. 
Table 3. SDLC steps (NIST 2002, 5; NIST 2008, 13 – 37). 
SDLC	step	 Description
Initiation	 The	 need,	 purpose	 and	 scope	 for	 the	 software	 is	 expressed	 and	
documented.	The	software	requirements	are	developed.	
Development	/	Acquisition	 The	software is	designed	and	developed	(or	procured).	
     (to be continued) 
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Table 3 (continues). 
SDLC	step	 Description
Implementation	 /	
Assessment	
The	software	is	configured,	enabled,	tested	and	verified	for	produc‐
tion	use.	
Operation	/	Maintenance	 The	 software	 performs	 its	 function	 in a	 production	 environment	
and	is	being	modified	through	potential	hardware	and	other	(code)	
changes	or	additions	as	well	as	by	changes	to	organisational	prac‐
tices.	
Disposal	 The	system	is	shut	down and	data	is	archived	and	moved	to	anoth‐
er	(new)	system.	
 
The related risk management activities for SDLC steps are described in table 4. 
Table 4. SDLC steps and related risk management activities (NIST 2002, 5; 
NIST 2008, 13 – 37). 
SDLC	step	 Risk	management	/	security	activity
Initiation	 Identified	risks	are	used	in	developing	the	software	requirements,	
including	 the	 security	 requirements	 so	 that	 it	 is	 ensured	 that	
threats	and	potential	 functionality	and	integration	constraints	are	
considered	 in	 line	 with	 the	 requirements.	 Security	 is	 looked	 at	
through	business	risks.		
Development	/	Acquisition	 Identified	 risks	 are	 used	 to	 support	 security	 analyses	 of	 the	 soft‐
ware.	This	might	have	an	impact	on	the	architecture	and	design	of	
the	 software.	 Security	 requirements	 are	 being	 analysed,	 security	
architecture	 is	designed	and	 functional	and	security	 testing	 is	be‐
ing	completed.	
Implementation /	
Assessment	
Risk	 management	 supports	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	 software	 by
comparing	software	implementation	against	the	requirements	and	
within	 the	 operational	 environment.	 Management	 of	 identified	
risks	must	be	decided	before	software	is	moved	to	operation.	Soft‐
ware	is	integrated	to	its	environment,	security	controls	are	tested,	
and	the	accreditation	is	completed.	
Operation	/	Maintenance	 Risk	 management	 activities	 are	 performed	 in	 line	 with	 software	
being	 re‐authorised	and	monitored	 for	performance	 in	a	periodic	
process.	The	 software	 is	 reassessed	when	 the	 IT	has	 faced	major	
changes	 in	 the	operational	environment	such	as	new	features	are	
developed	and	tested,	or	new	hardware	is	added	or	replaced.	The	
software’s	operational	 readiness	 is	 reviewed,	 the	 system	configu‐
ration	is	managed	and	the	processes	and	procedures	for	monitor‐
ing	of	the	system	are	being	set	up.	
     (to be continued) 
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Table 4 (continues). 
SDLC	step	 Risk	management	/	security	activity
Disposal	 Risk	 management	 activities	 are	 performed	 for	 disposable	 or	 re‐
placeable	 software	 components	 so	 that	 disposal	 is	 performed	
properly,	and	that	residual	data	is	being	handled	appropriately	and	
migration	to	new	system	happens	securely.	Closing	out	of	any	con‐
tracts	happens	at	this	stage.	Disposal	must	happen	within	a	transi‐
tion	plan	and	 the	needed	archiving	and	sanitisation	must	be	con‐
sidered	before	execution.		
 
It is important from Agenteq Oy’s perspective to realise the mapping of compa-
ny processes (described in chapter 1.3 and related subchapters) to SDLC steps 
because this focuses the risk management activities. The mapping is described 
in table 5. 
Table 5. Mapping SDLC steps and Agenteq Oy’s SDLC processes. 
SDLC	step	 Agenteq	Oy’s	process
Initiation	 New	feature	development	process
Development	/	Acquisition	 New	feature	development	process
Implementation New	 feature	 development	 process	 ,	 implementation	 project	 pro‐
cess,	operator	process	
Operation	/	Maintenance	 Customer	support	process,	operator	process	
Disposal	 No	specific	documented	process
 
Agenteq Oy’s implementation project process is acknowledged here. However, 
in the context of this development work it means the implementation of new fea-
tures for customer installations, and not implementing new Tampuuri installa-
tions as it also concerns Agenteq Oy’s product fulfillment scenarios. From an 
overall security perspective acknowledging the implementation project process 
is very important but it falls out of the scope of this development work because 
the impact of implementation projects (to the overall security) occurs through 
the existing, previously described processes. An important finding is also that a 
documented process does not exist for the disposal step of the SDLC. 
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Risk assessment 
Risk assessment is a component of the organisational risk management pro-
cess. The role of risk assessment is imperative in ensuring that leaders and 
managers make informed decisions that support the missions and business 
functions of their organisations. (NIST 2012, 1.) Risk assessment is an analysis 
of the current state of security, implemented through controls that protect an 
organisation’s assets, and a review of the probability of losses to those assets 
(Landoll 2011, 23). Risk assessments can be performed on three levels: on an 
organisation level, on a mission/business process level, and on an information 
system level (NIST 2012, 1). On the lowest, the information system level, risk 
assessment can be used to determine the information system’s vulnerability to 
attacks through identifying functionality aspects which might need deep security 
review (Microsoft Corporation 2012, 20). On the two higher levels, organisations 
use a risk assessment to evaluate risks at the organisation and management 
level (NIST 2012, 1). The significance of a risk assessment on these levels is 
described in table 6. 
Table 6. Risk assessment at organisational levels (NIST 2012, 18 – 20). 
Level	 Risk	assessment’s	significance
Organisational  Focus	on	organisational	operations,	assets	and	individuals	
 Support	for	strategies	policies,	guidance	and	processes	
 Results	 are	 communicated	 to	 organisational	 entities	 at	
other	levels	
Mission	/	Business	process	  Focus	on	missions/business	process	protections	and	resil‐
iency	requirements	
 Guidance	for	information	system	usage	and	help	for	man‐
aging	information	security	architecture	
 Results	 are	 communicated	 to	 organisational	 entities	 at	
other	levels	
     (to be continued) 
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Table 6 (continues). 
Level	 Risk	assessment’s	significance
Information	System	  The	scope	is	specified	by	the	missions	/	business	process	
level	context	and	the	SDLC	
 Evaluates	predicted	vulnerabilities	and	predisposing	con‐
ditions	which	might	affect	the	information	system’s	confi‐
dentiality,	integrity	and	availability	
 Results	 are	 communicated	 to	 organisational	 entities	 at	
other	levels	
 
The next issue to be covered is the risk assessment process in the security con-
text. A simplified description of this process is outlined in figure 9.  
 
Figure 9. Security risk assessment process (Landoll 2011, 24). 
The first step in the security risk assessment process is project definition. At this 
point the project scope must be decided, taking into consideration the impacting 
factors such as budget, the project’s objective, and what it is being assessed 
for, for example, the covered assets, the controls, and the boundaries of the 
project. The second step is project preparation in which a team is selected and 
introduced to the organisation. The factors impacting a team members selection 
includes the expertise and experience of the candidate. Other related tasks are 
reviewing the business mission, mapping assets, identifying critical systems, 
identifying threats and determining expected controls. (Landoll 2011, 23 – 25.) 
The third step is data gathering in which data is collected at an administrative, 
technical, and physical level about the effectiveness of current security controls. 
This step is the most comprehensive of them all. The fourth step is risk analysis. 
Risk analysis is a review of the gathered data and the result is an analysis of 
the risk to the organisation. The risk assessment team determines asset values, 
system criticality, potential threats, existence of vulnerabilities, and calculates 
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the risk for each threat/vulnerability pair. There are various methods for this step 
so calculations and presentations of risks can vary greatly (Landoll 2011, 23 – 
31.) Landoll (2011, 31) also states that deriving and presenting the risk can be 
performed quantitatively or qualitatively. However, NIST (2012, 14) includes 
definition of semi-quantitative risk calculation and states that all of these ap-
proaches have their advantages and disadvantages. 
The quantitative method relies on using specific formulas and calculations to 
determine the value of the security risk (Landoll 2011, 31). This is based on us-
ing numbers and this type of assessment mostly benefits if cost-benefit anal-
yses of alternative risk responses are being developed (NIST 2012, 14). The 
advantage here is objectivity and the ability to express in money, whilst the 
downside is that the calculations can be very complex and achieving accurate 
values can be difficult (Landoll 2011, 14). NIST (2012, 14) also adds that the 
quantification process is probably not reliable if there is any uncertainty in de-
termination of the values and that sometimes the costs might outweigh the ben-
efits of a quantitative approach. On the other hand, the qualitative method relies 
on subjective measures in asset valuation (Landoll 2011, 31). This method is 
based on using non-numeric categories or levels (for example: low, medium, 
high) (NIST 2012, 14). This has the advantage of being easy to understand and 
in most of the cases, it provides an accurate enough indication of the security 
risk to an organisation (Landoll 2011, 31). The communication to decision mak-
ers is also easier (NIST 2012, 14). The downside here is that there is subjectivi-
ty which might mean that management does not trust the given information 
(Landoll 2011, 31). NIST (2012, 14) adds that due to the range of smaller val-
ues, it might make the relative prioritisation or comparison of the risks difficult. 
The semi-quantitative assessment, described by (NIST 2012, 14) brings the 
benefits of both quantitative and qualitative methods. This happens by using 
scales whose values and meanings are not maintained in other contexts. The 
results are separated into bins or scales which can be translated to qualitative 
terms but also allow for the relative comparisons of the risks themselves. An 
example is giving 35 points to one risk whilst issuing 70 to the other. The 70-
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point risk is seen to be a lot more significant than the lower scoring risks. For 
example, 90 points refers to a very high risk assuming there is a methodology to 
give risks points this way. However, the combined method requires expert 
judgment in assigning the values. (NIST 2012, 14.) These risk assessment ap-
proaches are summarised in table 7. 
Table 7. Risk assessment approach summary. 
Approach	 Advantage	 Disadvantage	
Quantitative	  Objectivity	
 Can	be	expressed	in	money	
 Complexity	
 Reliability	 based	 on	 de‐
termination	of	values	
 Difficult	 to	 get	 accurate	
values	
Qualitative	  Easy	to	understand	and	communicate	
 Adequate	enough	in	most	cases	
 Subjectivity	
 Might	 lack	management	
trust	
 Relative	 prioritisation	
and	 comparison	 can	 be	
difficult	 due	 to	 small	
value	scale	
Semi‐
quantitative	
 Benefits	of	both	methods	
 Translates	 well	 to	 both	 quantitative	
and	qualitative	scales		
 Requires	 expert	 judg‐
ment	 in	 assigning	 the	
values	
 
The fifth step in risk assessment process is risk mitigation. In this step a team 
develops recommendations for safeguards so that the identified risks can be 
reduced to an acceptable level. A safeguard, also called a countermeasure is 
used to reduce the risk to an organisation’s assets. They are categorised as 
preventive, defective or corrective. (Landoll 2011, 31 – 33.) These categorisa-
tions are described in table 8. 
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Table 8. Safeguard summary (Landoll 2011, 33). 
Safeguard	type Description
Preventive	 Deter	undesirable	events
Detective	 Indicate	occurrence	of	undesirable	events	 through	 identifying	condi‐
tions	
Corrective	 Correct	the	damage	caused	by	undesirable	events	
 
The process involves a mapping of safeguards to threat/vulnerability pairs, de-
termining the reduction of risk, determining the cost of the safeguards and 
grouping these safeguards as solution sets. An important step is to also consid-
er the residual risk since this indicates if the risk falls below the tolerance level. 
This way, it tells if the safeguard or control was effective enough. (Landoll 2011, 
31 – 33.) The concept of residual risk is summarised in table 9. 
Table 9. Residual risk summary (Landoll 2011, 34). 
Type	 Description	
Static	 Always	exists
Dynamic	 May	be	reduced	by	implementing	safeguards
 
It is important to realise that despite implementing all the possible security con-
trols, there is always a residual risk. In other words there is never 100% securi-
ty. (Landoll 2011, 33.) 
The final and sixth step is risk resolution and reporting. During this step, a report 
is developed for the project sponsor. The report should provide clear infor-
mation to all parties involved such as the executives and management. Senior 
management determines the resolution of the identified risks. (Landoll 2011, 23 
– 35.) Landoll (2011, 34) also states that risk resolution is a key concept in se-
curity risk assessment. The possible risk resolutions are summarised in table 
10. 
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Table 10. Risk resolution summary (Landoll 2011, 35). 
Concept	 Definition
Risk	resolution A	decision	by	senior	management	on	how	to	resolve	the	present‐
ed	risk	
Risk	reduction Reducing the risk	 to	 the	 organisation	 to	 an	 acceptable	 level	
through	implementing	additional	security	controls	or	improving	
existing	controls	
Risk	acceptance A	 decision	 by	 senior	 management	 to	 accept	 the	 risk	 based	 on	
business	reasons	
Risk	transference	 Transferring	 the	 risk	 to	another organisation	by	outsourcing	or	
getting	an	insurance	
 
Organisations typically wish to manage their risks. There are five options to 
achieve it. An organisation can ignore the risk which means nothing is per-
formed for the risk. An organisation can avoid the risk which means avoiding the 
actions that might realise the risk. An organisation can mitigate the risk when 
controls are implemented to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. An organisa-
tion can accept the residual risk and the business continues. This usually hap-
pens when the cost of implementing controls outweighs the potential impact of 
the risk itself. (Paul 2011, 24.) Landoll (2011, 5) describes this as the security 
risk mitigation step in the risk management process. The key is to inform the 
senior management so that they can make security-risk based decisions (Lan-
doll 2011, 5). A security risk can be accepted if senior manager believes it is in 
the best interest of the organisation (Landoll 2011, 34). An organisation can al-
so address the risk by transferring it to a third party. This can be the case when 
the cost of implementing security controls exceeds the cost of the potential im-
pact of the risk itself. (Paul 2011, 24.) 
In summary, one of the most important things of a risk assessment is the com-
munication and information sharing. Information produced from a risk assess-
ment should be effectively communicated and shared at all risk management 
levels. (NIST 2012, 22.) Landoll (2011, 395) also states that a risk assessment 
project is not complete without documenting and reporting the results. The risk 
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assessment process should create an ongoing communication and information 
sharing process amongst stakeholders in the organisation (NIST 2012, 22). Alt-
hough the risk assessment team may have a good view of the risks effecting 
the organisation, these must be conveyed to the whole organisation (Landoll 
2011, 395). 
41 
 
3 INFORMATION SECURITY CHALLENGES IN A 
SOFTWARE COMPANY 
Software security is more than just writing code (Paul 2011, 22). This comes 
from the fact that software development itself is a lot more than writing code. As 
McConnell (2004, 3 – 4) lists, there are many activities that belong to the con-
text of software development which are not just about writing code. Good ex-
amples are software architectures, system testing or maintenance. Mentally, 
these are easily grouped as programming (McConnell 2004, 4). One of the rea-
sons is that programming is the only activity that is guaranteed to be completed 
within the software development process since some projects may lack the re-
quirements, design and testing phases due to a lack of time (McConnell 2004, 
7). From a security perspective, some of the vulnerabilities are found in source 
code, but that is only a small portion of the overall risk since process and people 
related risks must also be considered (Paul 2011, 22). A process is where peo-
ple do activities and a disciplined process is imperative in adding security to 
software (Howard and LeBlanc 2003, 23). 
Secure software development consists of three elements: best practises, pro-
cess improvements, and metrics which have a goal to minimise security-related 
vulnerabilities and to also detect and eliminate them as early as possible in the 
SDLC (Microsoft Corporation 2012, 7). However, risk management integration 
in the SDLC is key to having a secure software development process. The risk 
management in software development is challenging, because it is not an exact 
science and it is still a maturing area. The asset value or data value determina-
tion can be very subjective. The trouble is that determining the chance of similar 
security breaches within an organisation in comparison to those few which are 
published is almost impossible. Customers often look for guilty personnel if a 
breach occurs and despite what a contract indicates, they consider the real risk 
belonging to the software provider. (Paul 2011, 22.) VAHTI 01/2013 guidance 
on information security in software development states that the requirements for 
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software development in an organisation consist of six things which are listed in 
table 11 (translated).  
Table 11. Requirements for a software development organisation (Valtiovarain-
ministeriö 2013, 32 - 41). 
Requirement	 Definition
Strategy	and	resourcing	  An	organisation	 supports	 information	 security	work	 by	
having	an	information	security	strategy	
 An	 organisation	 must	 recognise	 the	 key	 roles	 in	 infor‐
mation	security	and	reserve	enough	resources	for	secu‐
rity	implementation	
Policies	 Policies	are	guidelines	for	the	entire	organisation.	
 An	 organisation	 needs	 at	 least	 an	 information	 security	
policy	but	other	policies	might	be	required	as	well	
Risk	management	 In	the	software development lifecycle	steps	it	is	good	to	examine
the	 threats	 to	 the	 software	 being	 developed	 and	 the	 con‐
trols/safeguards	to	mitigate	these	risks.	
 Risk	 management	 and	 project	 know‐how	 has	 a	 central	
role	 in	 software	development,	 despite	 the	development	
model	being	used	
Know‐how	and	education	 The	 know‐how	 of	 the	 software	 developers	 is	 crucial	 for	 secure	
software	development.		
 Every	 employee	 must	 have	 education	 and	 awareness	
training	 in	 software	 security	 to	 have	 competence	 for	
their	work	
 An	organisation	needs	 to	have	people	 specialised	 in	 se‐
curity	and	to	be	able	to	advice	the	other	employees	
Technical	 software	 develop‐
ment	environment	
The	software	development	environment	must	also	be	protected.
It	must:	
 Comply	with	security	principles	and	best	practises	
 Include	access	management	
 Include	patch	management	
Business	 Continuity	 Manage‐
ment	
Depending	on	the	criticality	of	the	software,	there	might	be	vari‐
ous	requirements	for	the	confidentiality,	integrity	and	availability	
of	the	system.	These	should	be	incorporated	already	in	the	soft‐
ware	 design	 phase	 and	 be	 noted	 in	 the	 risk	 management	 and	
continuity	planning	phases.	
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Security awareness is raised in the VAHTI 01/2013 guidance on top of these 
requirements. It has been researched that user compliance with IS policies and 
instructions is a multifaceted construct. In addition to knowledge and skills, it 
relates to motivation and to organisational issues such as management, power 
and politics. (Puhakainen 2006, 139.) On the other hand, to change a person’s 
security behavior, the person should be guided towards self-management and 
responsibility of one’s own actions (Nykänen 2011, 275). Nykänen (2011, 275) 
continues that in the security training, the context of new knowledge and skills 
should be bound to a larger whole to improve the adaptability and utilisability in 
other environments. With this, the trained skills will cause a deeper and more 
effective learning experience whilst creating significance. A human often only 
needs a simple concrete explanation how and why one must operate in a se-
cure manner. (Nykänen 2011, 275.) This is in line with Karjalainen (2011, 157) 
who states that security training sessions need to use a different argumentation 
or persuasive messages, according to the different types of violations. All in all, 
it can be concluded that security awareness and compliance have a lot to do 
with how an employee is positioned in the organisation and how he or she feels 
about working there. Management needs to be an active participant in security 
development and any deviations need to be raised in a practical manner. The 
root causes of the problems must be found and the employee’s own responsibil-
ity in the course of action should be emphasised. These practical findings 
should be used as a source for internal education and awareness training. Self-
management can be achieved by encouraging people to make independent 
decisions in work. This is generally acceptable knowledge, but none the less 
good to internalise in a software development organisation as well. 
Another aspect is the organisational culture. Kivelä (2011, 208) has found that 
in a growing company special attention should be given to the openness of the 
feedback between supervisors and employees, since the greatest development 
potential comes from reflection and feedback. He also found that personnel 
should more openly examine what they do, including the results, and failures, in 
order to inspect the flaws in their own actions (Kivelä 2011, 208). Although the 
study was limited to the companies being studied, the results were trend-
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setting, and in this context are very interesting. Referring back to Nykänen’s 
(2011, 275) findings, self-responsibility is key to changing security behavior. It 
can also be said based on Kivelä’s findings, that this is most likely to be true in 
growing companies such as Agenteq Oy. Adding these factors into the compa-
ny including the quality of the feedback and the potential for truthful feedback is 
a key factor here. 
Organisational learning is also an interesting factor in the context of this devel-
opment work, since action research is about learning in action (Coghlan and 
Brannick 2010, 5). With information security it is also about learning as an or-
ganisation in this case. Suominen (2011, 136 - 137) found that a company op-
erating heavily within a customer interface is expected to immediately under-
stand its customers and their needs. Such a company is on the initial steps to 
have a certain intensity of learning (Suominen 2011, 136 – 137). The descrip-
tion of this type of company is very similar to Agenteq Oy. An additional finding 
was that the principles adopted in such a company were not because of peda-
gogical education but because of a leadership type of management (Suominen 
2011, 137). This also supports the view that management is at the heart of or-
ganisational learning regarding information security as well. 
Theory summary 
The key composite idea from the previous theories is to align Agenteq Oy’s in-
formation security activities to the company processes in order to make it inte-
grated into the SDLC. The internal information security development project 
started with this development work and has a lot to do with risk management 
activities in general, and creates a basis for the initial information security man-
agement system. However, the major practical role for this work is focused on 
the risk assessment side and to obtain the required information for the initial risk 
management. The company’s steps to the managed future from information 
security perspective are developed based on this work. The challenges regard-
ing information security awareness, information security policy compliance, in-
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formation security culture and general organisational culture and learning is 
something that needs to be acknowledged to make the project successful. 
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4 DEVELOPMENT PROCESS OVERVIEW 
4.1 Process overview 
The research setup is described in figure 7. The core groups in the research 
process were the customer support and operator, Tampuuri development, 
product management and implementation project groups. They formed the re-
search group. The steering group was a management group. These are clarified 
in chapter 5. 
Support and 
operator group
Tampuuri development 
group
Product management 
group
Asset and process 
documentation
Security risk 
assessment Self-assessment
Best practise
material analysis
Steering group
Process improvement / 
suggestions
Realising knowledge 
gap
Implementation project 
group
 
Figure 10. Research setup. 
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The research group did the first brainstorming of the assets. The group also 
checked that the process flowcharts were up to date and represented the real 
environment the people work in. Next the group performed the actual security 
risk assessment and these sessions ended with a group’s self-assessment of 
the current information security practices in Agenteq Oy. The results gathered 
through these steps were documented and structured into the working area of 
the steering group for further processing. Risks were documented so that that 
they could be easily understood and communicated. The results were then dis-
cussed with the research group with the best practice security knowledge as a 
reference to find the potential solutions and make suggestions to the group it-
self. This was used as a basis to understand the knowledge gap and form the 
understanding of needed development steps. This process is expanded upon in 
chapter 5. 
4.2 General timeframe of the process and iterations 
The overall process started in February 2012 with the project launch executed 
by Agenteq Oy’s CEO during the first steering group meeting. The process oc-
curred in the three main iterations which were preceded by initiation iteration 
and followed by the closing iteration. These are summarised in table 12. 
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Table 12. Main iterations of the development work. 
(S= steering group, R = research group, MR = main researcher). 
	 Initiating		
02/12	–	03/12	
First	iteration	
04/12	–	07/12	
Second	iteration	
08/12	–	12/12	
Third	iteration	
1/13	–	05/13	
Closing	
05/13	
1.	Initialisation	 Project	 launch,	
InfoSec	 policy	 ini‐
tiation	(S)	
	 	 	 	
2.	Literature	 Gathering	 infor‐
mation	(MR)	
Gathering	 infor‐
mation	(MR)	
Gathering	 infor‐
mation	(MR)	
Gathering	 infor‐
mation	(MR)	
	
3.	Information	
security	policy	
Planning	(S)	 Development	(S)	 Launch	(S)	 Security	 guidance	
development	(S)	
	
4.	Security	refer‐
ence	material		
	 Developing	(MR)		 Developing	 (MR)
Presentations	
(MR)	
Best	 practise	 ma‐
terial	analysis	(R)	
	
(to be continued) 
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Table 12 (continues). 
	 Initiating		
02/12	–	03/12	
First	iteration	
04/12	–	07/12	
Second	iteration	
08/12	–	12/12	
Third	iteration	
1/13	–	05/13	
Closing	
05/13	
5.	 Assets	 and	 pro‐
cess	 documenta‐
tion	
	 Brainstorming	and	
checking	(R)	
Risk	assessment	 Risk	 assessment	
result	analysis	
	
6.	Management	
interview	
	 	 CEO	 Interview	
(MR)	
Used	 in	 determin‐
ing	the	level	of	risk	
list	
	
7.	Risk	assessment	
and	self‐
assessment	
Determining	 the	
suitable	 assess‐
ment	 method	
(MR)	
	 Meetings	 with	 the	
research	group	(R)
Internal	 site	 for	
the	 risk	 list	 (MR),	
result	analysis	(S)	
	
8.	Best	practise	
material	analysis	
	 	 	 Analysis	 meetings	
(R)	
	
        (to be continued) 
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Table 12 (continues). 
	 Initiating		
02/12	–	03/12	
First	iteration	
04/12	–	07/12	
Second	iteration	
08/12	–	12/12	
Third	iteration	
1/13	–	05/13	
Closing	
05/13	
9.	Realising	
knowledge	gap	
	 	 	 Analysis	 meeting	
result	 discussion	
(S)	
	
10.	Exit	 	 	 	 	 Action	part	closed	
11.	Elicit	results	 	 	 	 	 Elicit	 results	 and	
writing	the	report	
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The model for this type of an action research iteration reporting was taken from 
a publication by Iversen et al. (2004, 411). During the spring of 2012 the devel-
opment process was being prepared. This occurred simultaneously with the 
management finalising the new information security policy. The main initial liter-
ature and pre-understanding for this development work was gathered in spring 
2012. New information was being generated and found all the time due to the 
action research methodology. The new information security policy was launched 
in August 2012 which also started the action phase of this development pro-
cess. The action phase lasted until May 2013 when the development work was 
finalised. 
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5 DEVELOPMENT PROCESS DETAILS 
5.1 Initiating iteration 
The project started in February 2012. Agenteq Oy’s CEO approved the project 
plan and it was decided that the steering group for the project consisted of the 
CEO, the IT Service Manager, and the main researcher. The steering group and 
the responsibilities are stated in table 13. 
Table 13. Steering group. 
Member	 Responsibility
CEO	 Administrative security
IT	Service	Manager	 IT	Security
Main	researcher Software	security
 
It was understood in the early stages based on description by Hakala et al. 
(2006, 7) that the first item needed was the information security policy for the 
company. From the development work’s perspective it was a context-creating 
factor but also a prerequisite for the action steps to be implemented. Hakala et 
al. (2006, 7) state that developing an information security policy is the responsi-
bility of the organisation’s top management. 
The information security policy was required to be publicly under development 
before the actual security development work could start in the company. It was 
acknowledged in the steering group that in order to argument for the change 
and further security development actions and to get personnel involved, the in-
formation security policy document must be developed to support that. Paul 
(2011, 27) states that a security policy is an instrument which can provide the 
needed enforceability. 
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At that time the information by Hakala et al. (2006, 8-9) about the information 
security policy was available. However, there was difficulty in understanding 
what do areas of information security policy mean in practise. How should they 
be expressed in order for it to work in the best way from an organisation’s per-
spective? How can the message be translated into action and not to contain just 
phrases? It was the same worry as stated by Hakala et al. (2006, 8). A practical 
model was needed and the development work started by looking for what kind 
of implementations had already been conducted by other organisations. The 
best model was found in the VAHTI 2/2011 guidance by Valtiovarainministeriö 
(2011, 29 - 30). The development work continued based on it. 
Although chapter 2 of this development work discusses what risk management 
is, there is not much information from this perspective since formal risk man-
agement activities do not yet exist. Neither does it cover the situation where a 
software provider wants to consider the risk from a service perspective. How to 
manage the risk that a software provider may impose on its clients? Therefore, 
some initial difficulty was to understand how to get there from the basis of hav-
ing informal risk management activities. As was discussed in chapter 2, infor-
mation security risk is a component of organisational risk. This was a confusing 
factor, since Agenteq Oy’s management certainly understood what risk man-
agement is from a business perspective. However, the practical components to 
manage information security risks were missing. Based on NIST (2008) it was 
understood that a consideration of the system development lifecycle was need-
ed to try to find the elements in the company’s software development processes 
which match the elements in the NIST (2008) definition of SDLC. This argumen-
tation and the process mappings were discussed in chapter 2. 
The need for the company to perform a risk assessment was raised during this 
time. It was realised that security risk management is key to solve these issues. 
Through implementing the information security policy and risk assessment for 
the SDLC, an initial understanding of the risk level is obtained. NIST (2002, 1) 
states that the risk management process is the process of identifying, assessing 
and managing risk, and therefore implementing these steps through risk as-
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sessment creates the initial understanding what the current risk landscape con-
sists of. In Agenteq Oy’s context this can also be categorised as an experiment 
to understand information security. 
Although the initial focus was just to do the risk assessment once, it was 
acknowledged that working through it, a continual process and better under-
standing could be achieved. The CEO demanded that information security 
would be an integrated process. Considering based on chapter 2 that the risk 
management process consists of framing risk, assessing risk, responding to risk 
and monitoring risk, the assessment and response were in focus here and the 
idea was to see how they impact on understanding the framing of risk. The de-
cision was to perform the first risk assessment focused on the Tampuuri product 
because it is the company’s flagship product having an entire SDLC which can 
be mapped to the NIST (2008) definition of SDLC. 
Considering NIST (2011,1) stated that information security risk is commonly 
linked to the operation and usage of information systems, with Agenteq Oy it is 
linked to the operation and development of the Tampuuri product in the context 
of this development work. NIST (2012, 1) states that risk assessments can be 
performed on three levels (organisation, business process, information system). 
These levels were reflected because an initial understanding of Agenteq Oy’s 
organisation-wide security risk assessment was being initiated through imple-
menting a risk assessment on a business process-level related to the Tampuuri 
product. That itself represents the information system level. As discussed in 
chapters 1.2 and 1.3, this setting is also likely to be true to Agenteq Oy’s cus-
tomers due to Tampuuri being such a relevant product in their business. The 
technical IT side managed by the IT Service Manager was decided to be be-
yond the scope of this development work. 
The next thing to look for was the suitable method for the risk assessment. After 
inspecting a few options it was determined to be the Octave Allegro (later Alle-
gro) method. This was accepted by the CEO. This was important just as Caralli 
et al. (2007, 23) state since gaining senior management sponsorship is a critical 
factor to the success of an Allegro risk assessment. 
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Allegro was selected since it is tailored for organisations which do not have the 
time or resources to do a full-scale risk assessment. Allegro does not require 
extensive risk assessment knowledge and it focuses on information assets from 
usage, storage, transportation, processing and an exposing perspective. Allegro 
is supplemented with free material such as guidance, worksheets, and ques-
tionnaires and it can be performed in a workshop-style. (Caralli et al. 2007, 4 - 
5.) In Agenteq Oy’s case, the risk is all about the customer’s information in the 
Tampuuri product and the fact that the company does not have deep knowledge 
of risk assessments. Caralli et al. (2007, 28) also claim that Octave Allegro can 
be used in the SDLC for the information assets that support a process that an 
organisation wants to automate. The solution is to capture the security require-
ments of the assets that support business requirements. Gaps in the current 
control structure can be identified and this information can be used to incorpo-
rate the missing controls to the set of requirements. (Caralli et al. 2007, 28.) 
Agenteq Oy acknowledged that it needs a risk assessment method that is easy 
to understand, is well-structured, and still produces meaningful results. Allegro 
seemed to fulfill this criteria. The first step in Allegro is to establish the risk 
measurement criteria (Caralli et al. 2007, 17 - 18). The CEO of Agenteq Oy did 
this task. This is precisely in line with what Hakala et al. (2006, 90) mention, 
where setting the criteria for risk is the responsibility of the organisation’s man-
agement. The distinction to the definition by Hakala et al. (2006. 90) was that 
these were discussed with the information management unit, represented by 
the IT Service Manager, but the CEO did the required decisions by himself. It is 
an important factor here that Allegro is a semi-quantitative method. The semi-
quantitative assessment and calculation method was discussed in chapter 2. 
When the CEO sets the risk criteria, the management trust, and an expert 
judgment issues can be mitigated. This is a clear benefit in Allegro because it 
stimulates and involves the management too. 
Although the information security policy work recently started, the CEO was 
able to define the information lines most important for the company so that 
these can be worked on and be used in the initial risk assessment preparation 
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steps. The definition of the information lines include, as Paul (2011, 26) and 
Hakala et al. (2006, 8) state, the assets Agenteq Oy sees as being valuable and 
must be protected. These information lines were discussed in chapter 1.1 and 
they represent the central targets in Agenteq Oy’s information security just as 
Hakala et al. (2006, 8) describe. 
It was decided that the development project should be announced internally in 
the company and it was essential that the personnel participate actively. A ma-
jor announcement campaign by all the members of the steering group was per-
formed in the company events and announcements. Paul (2011, 27) states that 
successful implementation of a security policy requires marketing efforts. The 
goals of the management need to be communicated through the policy to the 
end users (Paul 2011, 27). It was acknowledged that personnel must want to 
want to work towards better the information security, so that they can be self-
responsible. This was in line with what Nykänen (2011, 275) states that self-
responsibility is key to changing security behavior. The decision was to include 
people from all the relevant operative groups. This is in line what Hakala et al. 
(2006, 81) state by selecting the personnel participating in the risk assessment, 
the goal should be to strive for a representative cross-section of the organisa-
tion's staff. This was shortly described in chapter 4.1. The structure of the re-
search group was decided by the CEO. This structure is outlined in table 14. 
Table 14. Research Group 
Operative	Unit Personnel
Customer	support	and	operator Customer	support	team	leader,	two	system	specialists	
Tampuuri	development	 Development	 team	 leaders	 (technical	 modules,	 financial	 mod‐
ules)	
Product	Management	 Product	Managers	(technical,	financial,	e‐services)	
Implementation Project	Manager
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From the Tampuuri perspective this is the most representative set of personnel 
there can be. These people are the ones working in Agenteq Oy’s SDLC. The 
initiating iteration ended in continuing the work with the information security pol-
icy. 
The activities in the initiating iteration were related to the first two steps of the 
risk assessment process described in chapter 2. The initial steering group work 
matched what is described in the project definition step. The scope, boundaries, 
and initial understanding of the assets were materialised. This meant that the 
risk assessment would focus on the assets based on the information security 
policy. The project preparation step consisting of the risk assessment team se-
lection and its introduction was also implemented. 
5.2 First iteration  
The first iteration continued with the development of the information security 
policy. The key elements of the first draft of the information security document 
were perceived. These elements were related to the information security man-
agement system, information security education and instructions, informing, 
monitoring, and working in emergency conditions. 
Managing and supervising of the information security is a process in which a 
management system is established to respond to the security needs created by 
the operations of the organisation and changes in its operational environment. 
The information security management system (later referred to as ISMS) is a 
documented entity based on the operations and business risks of the organisa-
tion formed by the practices. An ISMS is authorised by the top management. An 
important element in implementing an ISMS is to define its rights and responsi-
bilities. The personnel responsible for the information security should be named 
and their authority should be defined clearly and explicitly. (Hakala et al. 2006, 
106 – 109.) 
In order for the information security to be integrated as discussed in chapter 2, it 
was decided that information security must be included in all the work instruc-
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tions and reporting. In practice this means that every instruction and assignment 
template has a position for information security argumentation and it has to be-
come clear that information security was considered before the task, during the 
task and after the task. The elements related to the information security man-
agement system and operations for emergency conditions were left out at this 
point. This was not in line with what Hakala et al. (2006, 8 - 9) stated but it was 
left to be determined based on the further steps of this development work. 
The actual work related to preparing for the risk assessment started at this itera-
tion. This work consisted of brainstorming the assets of Agenteq Oy in the re-
search group which mapped to the information lines stated by the information 
security policy. It was stated in chapter 2 that the second step of the risk as-
sessment, - project preparation -, includes the mapping of the assets. Landoll 
(2011, 85) states that identifying the assets to be protected is a key step in pre-
paring for a risk assessment. This is a necessary precursor to understanding 
the overall risk (Landoll 2011, 85). The research group also reviewed the pro-
cess flowcharts which represent the processes they work in since the assets 
naturally have connections to these processes. These flowcharts were dis-
cussed in chapters 1.3.3 to 1.3.5. It is important to note that the flowcharts also 
contain information about the relevant information system or the information 
source. 
The third important activity stated in this iteration was the development of the 
security reference material for the company. The key idea was that the material 
would serve later during the development work but also leave concrete results 
to the company in a way that can be utilised by the personnel in their work. The 
material was mostly based on Paul (2011) and OWASP (2012) guidance. The 
material was written to cover the security elements of the entire software devel-
opment lifecycle. The elements related to real-world challenges of personnel in 
Agenteq Oy were included as much as possible. It was stated in chapter 3 
about that the new knowledge found in security training should be bound to a 
larger entity. Key in the developed material was to have relevance in the context 
where the personnel work in Agenteq Oy. The material was developed to be 
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simple and concrete (although there were lots of it). In chapter 3 it was also dis-
cussed that a human often only needs a simple concrete explanation as to why 
and how one must operate in secure manner. The material was developed with 
this in mind. Material development continued in the third iteration. 
5.3 Second Iteration 
The second iteration started with the launch and implementation of the new in-
formation security policy which consisted of a major marketing campaign for the 
cause. It was first accepted in the management group and then announced by 
the CEO as was stated in chapter 1. Simultaneously, the steering group was 
nominated to be the information security authority in Agenteq Oy. One tool was 
to establish a mechanism for personnel to inform the steering group about the 
security deviations. Personnel were encouraged to report even the smallest 
cases and considerations. Management played an active role in security devel-
opment as was suggested in chapter 3. Management also actively marketed the 
new policy which is required for it to be successful (Paul 2011, 27). By estab-
lishing a mechanism to report security deviations, the personnel were encour-
aged to be self-responsible and this was the right thing to do here based on 
Nykänen (2011, 275). An important fact is that by implementing a reporting 
channel the aim was to create the tooling for risk monitoring and responding. 
These are elements of the risk management process which were discussed in 
chapter 2. The strong idea was that the risk landscape must be researched first, 
before any concrete action can be implemented. This brings new knowledge 
which can be used to frame the risk in the management process. 
The iteration continued with an interview with the CEO. The initial questions 
presented are outlined in table 15. 
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Table 15. CEO Interview questions 
Question	
1.	What	is	the	goal	for	Agenteq	Oy	in	3 ‐ 5	year	timeframe?
2.	How	does	the	predicted	future	line	with	the	new	information	security	policy,	and	with	the	goals	
for	the	information	security?	
3.	What	expectations	does	the	management	have	for	the	SDLC?
 
The reasoning behind these questions was to obtain background information for 
communicating the goals of management which, as stated by Paul 2011, 27), is 
an important factor. It was also performed to guide the further steps of this de-
velopment work, especially the risk assessment and its result processing. As 
discussed in chapter 3, the management is at the heart of the organisational 
learning. This meant trying to find the elements which are in management inter-
ests. That was a mechanism to gain support for activities but to also create a 
basis for the potential suggestions to be made. An important finding from the 
CEO interview was that a process-based approach is appreciated in the man-
agement since Agenteq Oy does not have a strong strategy-based approach. 
Another consideration was that management acknowledged that the new EU 
data protection regulation proposal might cause pressures for Agenteq Oy. The 
third important finding was that embracing information security culture is the 
greatest expectation for the SDLC by the management. (Borenius 2012.) 
The iteration then continued with the actual risk assessment. The initial work 
involved setting the risk criteria. This was already performed by the CEO as was 
discussed in previous chapter about the initiating iteration. Assets and process-
es were documented as a preparation for this process in the first iteration. The 
risk assessment was performed with the research based on the Octave Allegro 
process. The Octave Allegro process is described in figure 11. 
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Figure 11. Octave Allegro process (Caralli et al. 2007, 4). 
This was already initially opened up from a research perspective in figure 10, 
and the participating research group was described in table 14. The risk as-
sessment was implemented through meetings with the research group. Every 
target group had its own dedicated meetings. This was supported by the fact 
that Allegro is designed for this type of use (Caralli et al. 2007, 4). The activity 
implemented in Agenteq Oy is outlined in table 16. 
Table 16. Octave Allegro risk assessment process application in Agenteq Oy 
(Caralli et al. 2007, 32 - 64). 
Octave	Allegro	step	 Implementation	in	Agenteq	Oy
1.	 Establish	 risk	 measurement	
criteria	
Established	by	the	CEO.
2.	 Develop	 information	 Asset	
profile	
Chosen	 from	 the	 most	 critical	 assets	 brainstormed	 in	 the	 first	
iteration.	 The	 selection	 was	 based	 on	 the	 information	 security	
policy	 categorisation	which	was	meant	 to	 keep	 it	 consistent	 to	
overcome	 the	selection	and	valuation	 issues	stated	by	Caralli	 et	
al.	(2007,	24).		
     (to be continued) 
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Table 16 (continues). 
Octave	Allegro	step	 Implementation	in	Agenteq	Oy
3.	 Identify	 information	 Asset	
containers	
The	containers	were	brainstormed	in	the	risk	assessment	meet‐
ings.	 The	 developed	 process	 documentation	was	 used	 in	 deter‐
mining	these	so	that	the	focus	was	on	organisational	processes.	
4.	Identify	areas	of	concern	 Overall	broad	concerns	on	the	conditions	that	could	affect	assets	
were	recorded.	The	scenarios	occurred	previously	 in	real‐world	
situations	were	preferred.	
5.	Identify	threat	scenarios	 Threat	 scenarios	 were	 considered	 based	 on	 the	 previous	
knowledge	on	occurrences	in	real‐world	situations.	
6.	Identify	risks Risk	identification	was	performed as	suggested	by	the	method.
7.	Analyse	risks This	 was	 completed in	 the	 risk	 assessment	 meetings,	 but	 also	
later	in	the	steering	group	result	processing	meetings.	Value	was	
assigned	 to	 describe	 the	 extent	 of	 impact	 to	 an	 organisation	
based	on	the	risk	measurement	criteria.	
8.	Select	mitigation	approach	 This	was	 completed later	 in	 the	 result	 analysis	meetings of	 the	
research	 group	 result	 discussion	 but	 decided	 by	 the	 steering	
group,	especially	for	the	most	critical	risks.		
 
An exception to the Octave Allegro process was that the last step, the mitigation 
approach selection, was left to later meetings in next iterations where the re-
sults of the risk assessment in general were opened up. The highest risks were 
promptly reacted to by the steering group with an action plan. This Allegro pro-
cess matches the elements of Landoll’s definition of the last steps risk assess-
ment process discussed in chapter 2. These mapped steps were data gather-
ing, risk analysis, risk mitigation and recommendations. 
This iteration also contained a surprise factor. One of the Agenteq Oy’s major 
customers had performed a security audit for the Tampuuri product. This re-
vealed threats and risks which were taken into serious consideration in the con-
text of this development work. Timing for this was actually excellent because it 
complemented the knowledge about the risks in the Tampuuri product. 
After the risk assessment meetings a TUTTI self-assessment tool by Rousku 
(2012) was used by the research group. A self-assessment was conducted to 
gather information on how the current information security level is understood 
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by the personnel in Agenteq Oy. These were the questions from the TUTTI tool. 
The presented questions are listed in table 17 (translated). 
Table 17. Self-assessment questions (Rousku 2012). 
Question	
1.	Has	the	right	kind	of	information	security	attitude	and	culture	been	formed	into	your	organisa‐
tion?		
2.	Is	a	regular	information	security	education	arranged	used	to inform	for	the	personnel?	
3.	Does	the	management	and	supervisors	demonstrate	a	good	example	of	commitment	to	the	infor‐
mation	 security,	 support	 the	 information	 security	work	and	have	understood	 its	 significance	 and	
are	interested	in	it?	
4.	Are	the	assets	to	be	protected,	relevant	processes	and	related	information	systems	of	significance	
to	the	organisation’s	activity	been	described?	
5.	 Is	the	personnel	 instructed	and	educated	to	use	the	agreed	procedures	and	to	recognise	the	in‐
formation	material	to	be	protected,	classified	and	processed	based	on	the	confidentiality,	integrity	
and	availability	requirements	of	the	material?	
6.	Does	an	operations	model	exist	for	potential	occurrence	of	security	deviations	and	abuse as	well	
as	does	a	plan	exist	for	other	kind	of	error	conditions	in	your	organisation?	
 
The assessment is to be repeated later to measure the success of security de-
velopment activities in the future. The self-assessment is important in measur-
ing the information security management performance from a personnel’s per-
spective. 
5.4 Third iteration 
The third iteration started with an organisation change in Agenteq Oy. Figure 12 
outlines the new organisation. 
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Figure 12. Organisational structure of Agenteq Oy in 2013 (Agenteq Solutions 
Oy 2013). 
The major change was moving production so that it was performed in a single 
unit. From a security development perspective this is a good thing since imple-
menting development actions can now be performed consistently to all product 
development processes. These were separate before the change which was 
one reason to focus this development process to the Tampuuri development at 
first. Now the lessons learned with Tampuuri can be applied to other products 
through the same management. The organisation change had no impact on the 
research group’s or steering group’s role. 
The third iteration consisted mostly of analysing the results of the risk assess-
ment, and the steering group doing the overall security development and re-
sponse actions based on the results so far. The steering group established a 
centralised intranet site for managing the gathered risk list and for guiding the 
risk response activity. The model for the risk list was chosen to be a risk-action 
list described by Iversen et al. (2004, 402). It is a prioritised list of risk items with 
related resolution actions. Argumentation was mostly the fact stated by 
Agenteq’s CEO in the interview that a process is preferred over a strategy. The 
only downside was the lack of strategic oversight explained by Iversen et al. 
(2004, 402) but the decision was conscious based on the management’s state-
ment. 
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During the iteration a VAHTI 1/2013 guide related to software development was 
published (Valtiovarainministeriö 2013). It turned out to be very solid basis for 
Agenteq Oy to develop its own security guidances. The Sales Director of 
Agenteq Oy mentioned in a discussion that over 30% of the offer base (calcu-
lated monetarily) would benefit from Agenteq Oy being VAHTI-compliant (A 
Alkila 2013, pers. comm. 23 April). This greatly gave business value for security 
development in Agenteq Oy. 
Over the iteration the steering group conducted meetings to find out solutions to 
the most critical risks. The approach has been to solve the risks in a prioritised 
manner. This is in line in high-level with what Iversen et al. (2004, 415) explain 
about the four-step process. However, using the word ‘strategy’ may not proba-
bly the right one in this context. The situation regarding a risk is characterized. 
The risk is reanalysed to assess where the most serious (real) risk is when the 
potential misjudgments by the research group are also found. The actions are 
prioritised and then taken. (Iversen et al. 2004, 415.) 
The research group conducted a new set of meetings to find out potential risk 
mitigation actions from the best practice materials to the risks found out in the 
risk assessment. The materials used were based on VAHTI 1/2013 
(Valtiovarainministeriö 2013) and SAMM 1.0 (OWASP 2009). These results 
were documented on the risk-action list for the consideration and analysis of the 
steering group. This matched with what Landoll described as developing rec-
ommendations discussed in chapter 2 and also Octave Allegro’s select mitiga-
tion approach step (Caralli et al. 2007, 58 – 64). The residual risk which was 
discussed in chapter 2 was also evaluated to gain an understanding of the ef-
fectiveness. 
5.5 Closing 
The closing iteration consisted of eliciting results, making development sugges-
tions and writing the thesis report. Results were collected from the steps of the 
development process. Development suggestions were made for the information 
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security management model and for integrating security activities in the 
Agenteq Oy’s processes. These were presented at the management for actions. 
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6 RESULTS 
6.1 Research problem perspective 
The first research question was how to find, understand and document the se-
curity development needs in the SDLC. Based on the results it can be stated 
that in an execution of a risk based-approach in an organisation, a risk assess-
ment as a component of the risk-management process is a key. A well-
structured and supported risk assessment method using business criteria can 
cover this need entirely. When this is performed systematically in a process, it 
serves the management of the company. Adding the continual know-how de-
velopment together with the monitoring the operational environment this helps 
to achieve this purpose. The know-how development should be measurable to 
ensure it serves the objectives of the organisation. 
The second research question was how to manage risks in the SDLC. This can 
be performed through establishment of the tasks and responsibilities so that 
information security is managed in an integrated manner supported by the best 
practises. The information security activities in processes must be defined, doc-
umented and measured. The observed risks should be managed with the best 
of the organisation in mind. A two-way discussion, reflection and open feedback 
between the management and personnel should be encouraged. 
The final research question was how to turn risk management in the SDLC into 
a process. This is performed by integrating risk management into the manage-
ment processes. It can be supported with the establishment of a year clock. 
6.2 Data and information perspective 
The results consist of data, material, and learning gathered on the steps of the 
development work. One of results was the asset documentation in a mind map 
format and the process documentation. The process documentation was al-
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ready covered in chapter 1. The detailed asset documentation is beyond the 
scope of this report for business secrecy reasons but the number of assets per 
information line can be described. The assets are summarised in table 18. 
Table 18. Assets based on the information security policy categorisation. 
Information	line Number	of	assets
Information	owned	by	 custom‐
ers	
22 assets
Information	 concerning	 cus‐
tomers,	 in	 possession	 of	
Agenteq	Oy’s	personnel	
10 assets
Information	 concerning	
Agenteq	Oy’s	own	business	
13 assets
 
The greatest number of assets on the first area is explained by the fact that in-
formation owned by the customers is the highest priority. Therefore the greatest 
effort was placed on brainstorming and evaluating those assets. The developed 
security reference material covered the entire software development lifecycle, 
but also future considerations. These materials are listed in table 19. 
Table 19. Developed security reference materials. 
Material	 Usage
Information	 security	 integra‐
tion	into	investments		
Considerations	for	the	software	feature	planning	
Information	 security	 require‐
ments	
Considerations	for	the	software	feature	specifications	
Secure	software	design	 Considerations	for	the	software	feature	design	phase	
Secure	software	development		 Considerations	for	the	software	feature	development	phase
Secure	software	testing	 Considerations	for	the	software	feature	testing	phase	
     (to be continued) 
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Table 19 (continues). 
Material	 Usage
Software	implementation	 Considerations	for	the	software	feature	implementation	phase
Software	 distribution,	 mainte‐
nance,	and	disposal	
Considerations	 for	 the	 software	 feature	 distribution,	 mainte‐
nance	and	disposal	phase	
Information	 security	with	 agile	
methods	
Guidance	 for	 integrating	 information	security	 in	 the	agile	meth‐
ods	used	in	Agenteq	Oy	
The	 new	 EU	 data	 protection	
proposal	
Preparation	for	the	future	changes
 
The materials cover the phases of the SDLC. Company-specific matters such 
as the security integration into investments, information security integration into 
the agile methods, and the new EU Data Protection proposal were also cov-
ered. These materials were made available to the entire personnel immediately 
after they were finalised, and they were used in the best-practise material anal-
yses together with the external materials. The idea was that material could be 
used in the daily work. Porvari (2012, 204) suggests that it is extremely im-
portant that personnel explores the information security material and supervi-
sors should monitor this. 
The launch of the new information security policy also created change in the 
information security climate of Agenteq Oy. Due to the visible push from the 
management side the personnel also demonstrated increased activity and in-
terest in the matter. This proved the point that management activity is key in 
embracing security. Sydänmaanlakka, who is an experienced professional on 
human resource management, has stated in an interview that applying infor-
mation so that things are getting into practise is a manager’s responsibility 
(Tyykiluoto 2013). The organisational culture, called after in the management 
interview, is greatly dependent on the actions of the management. Considering 
what was discussed in chapter 3, this calls for continuous and open discussion 
70 
 
about the information security between the management and the employees. 
Embracing reflection and feedback as suggested by Kivelä (2011, 208) is im-
portant to keep an on-going discussion. The conclusion is that the implementa-
tion of the information security policy demonstrated a leadership type of man-
agement explained by Suominen (2011, 137) which is why it worked out so well. 
The implementation enabled and justified the personnel to be self-responsible. 
This actively encouraged reporting the security deviations and participating in 
the discussion. It was a lesson of organisational learning demonstrating the 
management’s role. This was supported by the results of the later self-
assessment which suggested that the general actions based on the implemen-
tation of the new information security policy have raised the awareness level of 
information security in Agenteq Oy. However, the results also demonstrated that 
the practical actions impacting on the daily work of the personnel are also re-
quired. The precise self-assessment results are left out for business secrecy 
reasons. 
The results from the management interview were already discussed in chapter 
4 because they had a direct impact on the research process. The emphasis on 
processes, embracing information security culture and acknowledgement of the 
new EU data protection regulation proposal were the key findings. While the 
lack of strategic direction was an interesting finding, Porvari (2012, 197) states 
that information security management is performed through process manage-
ment with a connection to the business management. From this perspective 
security development in processes is achievable with the current management 
principles. However, Trott (2012, 292) states that a business strategy consists 
of what the company might do, what the company can do and what the compa-
ny should do. From an information security perspective, a strategy is seen as a 
long period plan which guides the information security work in software devel-
opment at all levels of the organisation and it should not be separate from the 
core actions (Valtiovarainministeriö 2013, 31 – 33). From this perspective it 
should be noted that risk management activities could help in understanding the 
drawbacks the company might encounter. Implementing a risk management 
activity could be a part of the change to have a strategic direction. A strategy is 
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emphasised with the information security and with the risk management, which 
suggests that they could help in achieving a strategic approach. It was dis-
cussed in chapter 2 that the aim of a risk framing component in the risk man-
agement process is to produce a risk management strategy and to create a ba-
sis for risk-based decisions. In this context this supports the view that business 
decisions could be better justified if the risk is considered consciously. 
The risk assessment produced a list of risks. The result summary is listed in 
table 20. 
Table 20. Risk assessment results. 
No  Asset    Points Probability
6  Business information     23 High 
1  Configuration     14 Medium 
3  Configuration     14 Medium 
13  Personal data     10 Medium 
14  Personal data     13 Medium 
16  Connection strings     16 Medium 
20  Specs     14 Medium 
21  Specs     16 Medium 
22  Business information     14 Medium 
26  Business information     14 Medium 
27  Configuration     14 Medium 
28  Conversion material     21 Medium 
31  User name and password     12 Medium 
32  Conversion materials     21 Medium 
34  Business information     16 Medium 
35  Business information     14 Medium 
37  Business information     10 Medium 
2  Configuration     20 Low 
4  User name and password     24 Low 
5  User name and password     20 Low 
7  Business information     14 Low 
8  User name and password     14 Low 
9  User name and password     14 Low 
10  Business information     12 Low 
11  Business information     20 Low 
12  Personal data     21 Low 
15  Personal data     21 Low 
17  Source code     10 Low 
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18  Source code     14 Low 
             (to be continued) 
Table 20 (continues). 
No  Asset    Points Probability
19  Connection strings     16 Low 
23  Business information     16 Low 
24  Business information     16 Low 
25  Business information     16 Low 
29  Conversion material     21 Low 
30  Bank payment material     20 Low 
33  User name and password     14 Low 
36  User name and password     14 Low 
  
For this report the risks are left out for business secrecy reasons but the asset 
or the information area is included. The risks were valued based on criteria giv-
en by the management (discussed in chapter 5.1). Table 21 describes the risk 
valuation. 
Table 21. Risk valuation. 
Points  Probability  Interpretation 
Low  Low  Low risk 
Medium  Low  Notable impact, low risk 
High  Low  Significant impact, notable risk 
Low  Medium  Notable risk 
Low  High  Notable risk 
Medium  High  Significant risk 
Medium  High  Significant risk 
High  Medium  Significant, almost critical risk 
High  High  Critical risk 
 
The risk assessment results revealed that there exists 1 critical risk, 5 signifi-
cant risks, 23 notable risks and 8 low risks. Based on the results it can be stated 
that risks exist quite evenly and equally in the assessed areas. Business infor-
mation was a general asset category used if an asset could not be categorised 
more precisely or if the risk was of a general type. This contributes to the num-
ber of risks related to that asset. Based on the results analysis discussion and 
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evaluation, almost all of the risks had countermeasures which could have been 
applied and which would have mitigated the risks. The countermeasures were 
mostly preventive and detective and apply at process level described by Landoll 
(2011, 382). Most of the risks would have been significantly mitigated if coun-
termeasures would have been applied. Certainly the static residual risk dis-
cussed in the end of the chapter 2 always exists. A chance of human error is a 
common example of a static residual risk. 
The results of the risk assessment suggested that the integration of information 
security activity in the company processes has not been strong in Agenteq Oy: 
This was especially evident from the management perspective. Porvari (2012, 
212) states that information risks are business risks and they should be exam-
ined by the top management. Porvari (2012, 200) states that information securi-
ty management should be integrated into the general management processes. 
This suggests that management processes should get data from the processes 
in the organisation in order to do information-based decisions which support 
information security. 
Agenteq Oy does not have an ISMS as was stated in the discussion about the 
information security policy. The responsibilities related to information security 
are not stated practically so that it would be meaningful for the personnel. This 
is not in line with what was discussed in chapter 3. The VAHTI 1/2013 guidance 
starts from the fact that the responsibilities must be stated and the resources be 
allocated (Valtiovarainministeriö 2013, 32 - 33). This is supported by Hakala et 
al. (2006, 109) in the discussion about an ISMS. 
The information security policy does state that every person working in Agenteq 
Oy is responsible for information security but the practical point is missing. This 
was evident from the results of the self-assessment. For example the job de-
scriptions and the process tasks do not have a specification of the related and 
required information security activities. The view to information security has 
been technical when the resolutions have been left to the experts as discussed 
by Porvari (2012, 212). Porvari (2012, 197) also states that information security 
must be integrated into the daily activity. This means taking it into the activities 
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of the business units, processes and personnel (Porvari 2012, 197). From the 
SDLC perspective this is supported by the NIST (2008) as was discussed in 
chapter 2. The integration of information security into the SDLC consists of 
practical activities performed by the humans in the company processes. This 
activity requires reflection and feedback as suggested by Kivelä (2011, 208). 
This is supported by Porvari (2012, 212) by stating that management should 
enable two-way communication. The personnel should be trained into the in-
formation security but the training should be measured (Porvari 2012, 213). 
During the risk assessment process some new information was learned about 
the personnel. In the brainstorming session by the customer support and opera-
tor group it was realised that the members of this group have also a good basis 
for the risk management activities since they have completed an ITIL (Infor-
mation Technology Infrastructure Library) v3 certification. Paul (2011, 47) states 
that the security framework guidance in ITIL is very closely aligned to the infor-
mation security standards. Porvari (2012, 200) states that best practises sup-
port the information security. This suggests that a further implementation of ITIL 
practises might be a development option for Agenteq Oy in order to support in-
formation security activities. 
The Tampuuri development team leaders and product managers represent 
middle-management in Agenteq Oy. Their role is significant in working between 
the company layers - between the management and the personnel. The role of 
a team leader is significant in enabling the team work. Virkki (2012, 255) claims 
that the middle-management can have a major impact on business transfor-
mation based on their solutions. From Agenteq Oy’s perspective the SDLC is at 
the heart of the business. Therefore it can be deduced that the role of middle-
management in developing the SDLC is significant in Agenteq Oy. The top 
management should note this fact when planning the future actions. 
As a summary the research process educated Agenteq Oy about what is usual-
ly performed in processes and with what information. This creates the basis for 
recognising and evaluating the potential risk scenarios. A lot of organisational 
learning has happened as was already discussed. A lot of related risks were 
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found and also the countermeasures to them where recognised. Together with 
the received feedback this suggests that implementing a risk assessment was 
necessary. It also suggests that the risk assessment should be renewed in the 
near future and be integrated into the company processes. It was also acknowl-
edged better what the personnel think about the information security. This helps 
guiding the management actions. The resulted change consisted of the imple-
mentation of the new information security policy and the further related action. 
The information security policy authorised working for the information security in 
the company which is a very important consideration for future development 
activities. 
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7 DISCUSSION 
7.1 Summary 
The objective of this development work was to find tools for developing the se-
curity in the SDLC of Agenteq Oy and to create change. This was approached 
with the means of the action research method. The research was performed 
together with the key personnel in Agenteq Oy. The theory for the development 
work was researched from the literature which consisted of articles, books, dis-
sertations, legislation, guidance and best practice material. Some of the materi-
al was found by searching from the Internet but also based on the announce-
ments of dissertations by the universities and through academic search. 
The process started in February 2012 and focused initially on development of 
the information security policy for the company. The steering group and re-
search (focus) group was named. The research group started to focus on the 
preparations for the risk assessment including asset and process documenta-
tion. Subsequently with the research process ongoing, the development of se-
curity reference material for Agenteq Oy was performed. 
The new information security policy was launched in August 2012. This started 
the action phase in the research which consisted of implementing a risk as-
sessment in the company, interviewing the management, and implementing a 
self-assessment. The results of the risk assessment were documented for the 
processing, and also for recognising the countermeasures which would suggest 
the security development needs in the company. 
The spring 2013 consisted of processing the results and implementing coun-
termeasures. The results initiated a security guidance material development in 
the company which is still ongoing. Based on the overall results of the research, 
development suggestions were made to the management of Agenteq Oy. The 
research process ended in May 2013. However, from company perspective this 
started a process which should continue as long as the company exists. 
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During the research process new information was found due to the action re-
search methodology. This pointed that the results were not based only on the 
initial theory. The new theory found through implementing action in practise 
contributed also to the results. Occurrences over the course of the project had 
impact on the outcome. It made the comparison of the situation-specific infor-
mation to the theory challenging because the business itself required prompt 
actions. The cumulative understanding of the original theory and learned new 
theory was sometimes hard to understand in practise. 
7.2 Development suggestions 
Simultaneously with the results, a detailed development suggestion material 
was handed to the management of Agenteq Oy. The first suggestion was to 
have a stronger integration of the risk management into the current company 
management processes. The management group of Agenteq Oy has regular 
meetings and they could have risk management activities in the agenda. The 
data about the risk environment could be made available for the management if 
tasks and responsibilities would be defined in the processes in order to produce 
observable data which can be measured. That would happen through imple-
menting an ISMS system. This was the second suggestion. Implementing con-
trol activities in the processes would create data for the management decisions 
but also for the personnel for self-management. Implementation of these sug-
gestions has a strong relationship to the ongoing enterprise resource planning 
system (ERP) renewal project in Agenteq Oy. The observability can be ensured 
by collecting these needs as requirements for the ERP renewal. Based on this 
research, the suggestion for software development companies working with ag-
ile methodologies is that the use of action research is a well-argumented and 
considerable option. 
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7.3 Limitations and validity 
This development work was limited to the information side of the risk environ-
ment. It focused to the research problem from a software development life cycle 
perspective. The technical IT side was beyond the scope of this development 
work. These are sides of the same coin and related to the software develop-
ment life cycle, and they need each other. Information security consists of mul-
tiple elements. 
Due to the approach to research the problem from a company-specific point of 
view the generalisability of the results is limited. Action research does not aim to 
create universal knowledge (Coghlan and Brannick 2010, 149). The results can 
be extrapolated from a software-development oriented and growing company 
point of view. However, the style of management and therefore the processes 
vary between companies which should be noted when making comparisons. 
These are the significant factors which can be focused on as stated by Coghlan 
and Brannick (2010, 149). 
This research is valid because it produced answers to the research problem 
which was to find solutions for developing information security in Agenteq Oy. 
The information is based on theory found in literature but also based on the new 
knowledge generated within the research process. This is in line with the action 
research aim to produce practical new knowledge (Coghlan and Brannick 2010, 
36). The results support the information security policy of Agenteq Oy which 
was also an initial objective. 
The results of the risk assessment and the further actions are applicable only to 
Agenteq Oy. The criteria for the risk assessment were company-specific when 
the results were as well. However, the structural elements of integrating infor-
mation security based on the results are generalisable knowledge. 
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7.4 Further research 
An interesting subject for further research would be to find how greatly infor-
mation security could be developed through implementation of a new ERP sys-
tem. Software development companies do develop ERP systems for their cus-
tomers but an ERP system for a software development company is an interest-
ing concept from many research perspectives, in addition to the information se-
curity. 
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